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Abstract—This paper1 presents an efficient approach to an
existing batch verification system on Identity based group sig-
nature (IBGS) which can be applied to any Mobile ad hoc
network device including Vehicle Ad hoc Networks (VANET).
We propose an optimized way to batch signatures in order to
get maximum throughput from a device in runtime environment.
In addition, we minimize the number of pairing computations
in batch verification proposed by B. Qin et al. for large scale
VANET. We introduce a batch scheduling algorithm for batch
verification targeting further minimization the batch computation
time.
I. INTRODUCTION
VANET is recently a very popular direction for research
targeted to proper safety and efficiency in transport
management systems.High mobility, high speed of vehicles,
fast topology changes, and sheer scale are some characteristics
that establish VANET as an intensive research point different
from other types of ad hoc networks. Recently some security
hardwares are introduced to VANET vehicles which makes
it feasible to implement robust cryptographic tools [3]. For
example, Event Data Recorders (EDR) which record all
received messages s.t., position data, speed data, acceleration
data, time etc.; Tamper Proof Devices (TPD) which provide
the ability of processing, signing and verifying messages,
protect hardware from tampering by a set of sensors, possess
its own battery and clock, etc. Vehicle manufacturers along
with telecommunication industries are encouraged to equip
each car with On Board Units (OBUs) that allow vehicles to
communicate with each other, as well as to supply Road Side
Units (RSUs). The OBUs together with RSUs of a vehicular
ad hoc network (VANET) help to broadcast messages to
other vehicles or transport system terminals in their range.
It is a serious threat to privacy if attackers can track the
drivers’ geographical position, identity, or his driving pattern
by monitoring vehicular communication [5]. Alternatively,
there is no way to identify rogue vehicles, if the network is
completely anonymous.
Conventional signature verification mechanisms might
not be sufficient to satisfy the stringent time requirement in
VANET. For example, in a VANET environment hundreds of
vehicles are connected to one another at any time instance
and each of them may send messages every 100-300 ms
1Research supported by Graduate Research Program (GRP), JAIST grants.
within a period of 10 s travel time. Therefore, a vehicle
needs to verify hundreds of message signatures per second
[7]. Although only one signature is received by Dedicated
Short Range Communication (DSRC) transmission at a time,
a large number of signatures are buffered at receiving station.
According to [8], consumption period of a DSRS transmission
is too shorter than that of verifying a signature. For this
reason, verifying a huge number of messages one after one is
impractical and may cause bottlenecks at TPD in the vehicle.
Moreover, some signatures might arrive from emergency
vehicles like ambulance, petrol police, security van etc. that
incur urgent response (short due time) from the receivers. As
a consequence, many messages coming from other vehicles
may be discarded due to time constraints or proper scheduling.
In order to deal with all the challenges mentioned above
[2,4-7], a number of batch verification mechanisms have
been proposed [1,10,11]. In this paper, we consider the batch
verification described in [1] that was designed for large
scale VANET. They introduced several features like (i) an
Identity based Group signature with easy-to-manage smaller
groups, (ii) Revoking the anonymity of signatures by Open
Authority in case of disputed or suspected forged messages,
(iii) A selfish verification mechanism to speed up signature
processing. We use the same group signature mechanism
in [9] as [1] used to provide anonymity and traceability.
To alleviate the burden of signature verification, we further
improve batch verification described in [1]. For example, we
reduce the calculation of pairing from 11 to 3 per signature.
In addition, we introduce a batch scheduling algorithm to
reduce the time consumption of batch verification at a greater
extent. Besides that we include revocation procedure if the
message is doubtable to be corrupted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II, background and preliminary knowledge related to the
proposed research are given, including network model, basics
of batch verification, and security requirements. In section III,
IBGS scheme used in this paper is described in detail. Section
IV discusses the proposed batch verification scheme including
batch size and signature scheduling algorithm and doubtable
message verification technique. In section V, security analysis
and performance evaluation are presented in brief. Finally,
section VI concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1. VANET Network Model
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Assumptions.
We assume that Trusted Escrow Authority (TEA) is fully
trusted. Other entities e.g., Vehicles, Group Managers (GM),
and Opening Authority will need to register before operation.
Registration of the vehicle may include the vehicle’s number
plate, identity, and driver information to recognize the vehicle
and its owner uniquely. However, GMs are well trusted since
Access Networks are usually set up in an open environment
which is vulnerable to security breaches. That is why, TEA
should check the security parameters of the GMs periodically.
B. Network Model.
Our network model is shown in Fig. 1., where On-Road
unit refers to the units on the roadside e.g. vehicles, Access
Network Manager. Groups can be formed in many ways. For
example, by region or area where the vehicles are regis-
tered e.g., New York city, Tokyo city etc.; by social spot
e.g., shopping mall, official zone, military zone, educational
institutions etc.; by category of the vehicles e.g., personal
cars, ambulance, police cars, fire trucks etc. These groupings
help in applying policy to manage the vehicles intelligently.
This is a hierarchical network, from TEA to vehicles. All
the vehicles are attached, accessed and managed by Group
Managers and Group Managers are subsequently attached
to TEA. Alternatively, Traffic Security Division is attached
with both Off-Road and On-Road units simultaneously. TEA
is responsible for issuing key, revocation. Each device need
to be equipped with On Board Unit (OBU) consisting of a
temper proof device(TPD), Global Positioning System (GPS)
an Event Data Recorder(EDR). Usually a Road Side Unit has
DSRC with a vehicle’s OBU. All communications such as
Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-AccessNetwork should be
time synchronized.
C. Batch verification.
1) Small Exponent test: M. Bellare et al. [10] gave the first
idea about fast batch verification on digital signatures. They
proposed Small Exponent test for batch verification.
• Choose δ1....δn ∈ {0, 1}l
• Compute a =
∑n
j=1 ajδj mod q and y =
∏n
j=1 y
δj
j .
where aj , yj ∈ Zq
• Check whether it holds: ga = y. if yes accept, else reject.
We can expect low error from the Small Exponent Test if we
choose δ1....δn from a large domain.
2) Basic Batch Techniques: A.L. Ferrara et al. [11] pro-
posed 3 techniques to develop an efficient batch verifier for
bilinear equation which is applied in our scheme. Here are
their techniques in brief:
• Technique 1. Sigma-protocols, usually called
∑
-
protocols, have three move structures: commitment, chal-
lenge and response. This is one of the implementable pro-
tocols of Proof of knowledge. These three steps degrade
the verification mechanism worse. Ferrara et. al. suggest
to reduce it as (commitment,response) policy to achieve
much more verifiable equations. For pairing, they propose
two sub-steps:
– Check membership: Only elements that an adversary
could attack need to be checked. Public parameters
need not be checked, or it can be checked once.
– Small Exponent Test: Perform the test to combine all
the equation into one.
• Technique 2. Move the exponent into the pairing, for
example, Replace e(gi, hi)δ
i
with e(gδ
i
i , hi). It speeds
up the exponentiation process.
• Technique 3. If two pairing with a common elements
appear. It will reduce n pairing to 1.For example, replace∏n
i=1 e(g
δi
i , h) with e(
∏n
j=1 g
δi
i , h)
D. System Security Requirement.
VANET is concerned with public safety and vehicle privacy.
An attacker who usually observes and analyzes the traffic in
the network is called passive or external attacker. However, a
compromised vehicle or device, called an internal attacker,
can be more influential. An IBGS scheme in a VANET
environment needs to ensure correctness, anonymity, trace-
ability, nonframeability, revocability,liability and scalability
as security and system requirement. We will give a brief
description of these properties.
• Anonymity. A signature scheme is anonymous if no PPT
adversary can identify the message originator by mon-
itoring the communication between vehicles or access
points as a passive attacker. According to privacy require-
ments, vehicle and owner information needs to be secret.
Anonymity mechanism ensures that any identification
related to vehicle will not be advertised or be traceable
except in some special situation by some designated party.
• Revocability. If the vehicle doubts a received message
with a valid signature then it should be able to send
the message to the verifier to judge identification of the
message sender and hence revoke a malicious signature.
Unfortunately this is a threat to privacy, but for the sake
of public safety, personal privacy needs to be sacrificed.
If anonymity is realized without any revocability mech-
anism, an inside attacker can anonymously broadcast
forged messages to other vehicles, which may seriously
degrade public safety and system reliability as well.
• Liability. Liability demands that the sender of the mes-
sage should be responsible for the message generated.
Authentication, integrity and nonrepudiation must be sup-
ported in the network to ensure liability.
• Traceability. A scheme is traceable if any polynomial-
time attacker has only a negligible probability of produc-
ing a valid group signature such that the output is not the
identity of the group signature originator.
• Correctness.The signature scheme is correct if it has
verification and opening correctness.
• Scalability. In a densely populated metropolitan area,
every day hundreds of vehicles are registered, stolen, and
loose secret key. It entails extra job of message signature,
verification, judging etc. while preserving all the security
requirements. Therefore, it is essential for the network to
be scalable for smooth management.
• Non-frameability. It requires that the attacker be unable
to created a judge-accepted proof that an honest user
produced a certain vald signature unless this user really
did produce this signature.
III. VANET BASED IBGS
An ID based group signature scheme [9], where there are
group managers, group members, and the Open Authority, pro-
vides a full traceability, a full anonymity and non-frameability
as needed for VANET application. Thats why, [1] chooses [9]
for large scale VANET. We summarize [9] as follows:
A. Setup(1l).
Let a security parameter (1l) ,p is a prime and finite cyclic
groups G1 = 〈A〉 and G2 = 〈B〉, where there exist a
computable isomorphism Ψ = G1 → G2 and a non-degenerate
bilinear pairing e : G1×G2 → G3. For initial setup TEA will
do the followings:
1) Set < = (p,G1,G2,G3, A,B, e)
2) Choose A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 ∈ G1
3) Define cryptographic function
• HV : {0, 1}∗ → G1 for Vehicles
• HO : {0, 1}∗ → G1 for TSD
• HR : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p for GM
• H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p for vehicles to compute or, to
verify challenges.
4) Generate private Key (xT ) ∈ Z∗p and
public key (KT ) = BxT ∈ G2
5) Finally, produce the system’s public parameter:
param = (<, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, HV , HO, HR, H,KT )
B. Key Generation.
TEA generates private keys for all the entities in the system
including vehicles, GMs, and TSD with the identities they
provide.
• GM: With the identity of GM IDR, TEA generates
private key xR = r + HR(C||IDR)xT mod p where
r ∈ Z∗p and C = Br. TEA issues (C, xR) to each Group
Manager. It is to mention that TEA provide the additional
string C to all the GM to register with corresponding
vehicles.
• TSD: Private key xO = HO(IDO)xT where IDO is the
identity of TSD.
• Vehicle: Private key xV = HV (IDV )xT where IDV is
the identity of a vehicle.
Vehicles need to complete registration with their corre-
sponding GM. GM firstly runs a proof of knowledge of
vehicular private key xV for its Identification without any
information leakage. Additionally GM sends the additional
string C as it got from TEA. It also manages a registration
table or database to entry the vehicle as a group member.
C. Group Join Protocol.
TEA is the only trusted authority. Before joining the group,
a vehicle has its ID and secret key generated from TEA. To
get a membership certificate a vehicle needs to perform a
protocol with the certificate issuer called GM as shown in Fig.
2. At the end of the protocol, a vehicle becomes a member of
the group and obtains a membership certificate (D, t, C) as a
Group Signing Key. GM computes W which is stored in the
database for future use. In case of irregular behavior, W will
help TSD to reveal the identification of a vehicle.
D. Signing and Authentication.
A registered vehicle under a group having a secret key xV
and Group Signing Key(D, t, C) can anonymously generate
a signature Υ on a message M . At the same time, it allows
TSD, or Open authority to open the signature if needed.
Detailed descriptions are as follows:
1) Choose s1 ∈ Z∗p and set (Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ5, s2) =
(As1 , xVA
s1
1 , HV (IDV )A
s1
2 , DA
s1
3 ,Γ
t
3A
s1
4 , ts1 mod p)
2) Choose d ∈ Z∗p and set (v1, V2) =(
e(HV (IDV ), B)e(HO(IDO),KT )
d, Bd
)
3) Select randomly (r1, r2, r3, r4) ∈ Z∗p and
(R1, R2, R3) ∈ G1 and compute
• (β0, β1, β2, β3, β5, β7) =(
Ar1 , R1A
r1
1 , R2A
r1
2 , R3A
r1
3 ,Γ
r3
3 A
r1
4 , B
r4
)
• (β4, β6, β8) =
(
[e(A1, B)
−1e(A2,KT )]r1 , e(A3, B)r2
[e(A3, S)e(A2A4, B)]
r1 , e(HO(IDO),KT )
r4e(A2, B)
−r1
)
4) Compute f = H
(
(Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ5)||C||v1||V2||M ||
(β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8)
)
Vehicle (xV ) GM (C, xR)
Run Proof of Knowledge for xV [?]
Compute D = A5/HV (IDV )
1/(t+xR) t ∈ Z∗p
Compute W = e(HV (IDV ), B)
Record (IDV , D, t,W ) for future use.
(D, t, C)←−−−−−
Check validity of C [?] and accept if
e(A5, B) = e(D,B)
te(D,S)e(HV (IDV ), B)
holds for S = CKTHR(C||IDR)
Fig. 2. Group Joining Protocol
5) Compute
• (z0, z1, z2, z3) =
(
r1 − fs1 mod p,
r3 − ft mod p, r2 − fs2 mod p, r4 − fd mod p
)
• (Z1, Z2, Z3) = (R1x
−f
V , R2HV (IDV )
−f , R3D−f )
6) Signature for batch verification
Υ =
(
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ5)||(z0, z1, z2, z3, Z1, Z2, Z3)||f ||
C||v1||V2||(β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8)||S
)
E. Individual Message Verification.
After getting a signature Υ, a vehicle verifies the signature
as follows:
• Set (Γ4,Γ6,Γ8) = (e(Γ1, B)−1e(Γ2,KT ), e(A5, B)−1
e(Γ3, S)e(Γ2Γ5, B), V1e(Γ2, B)−1)
• Compute S = CKTHR(C||IDR)
• Compute (β0, β1, β2, β3, β5, β7) =(
Az0Γf0 ,Z1A
z0
1 Γ
f
1 ,Z2A
z0
2 Γ
f
2 ,Z3A
z0
3 Γ
f
3 ,Γ
z4
3 A
z0
4 Γ
f
5 ,Bz6V
f
2
)
• Compute(β4, β6, β8) =
(
[e(A1, B)
−1e(A2,KT )]z0Γ
f
4 ,
e(A3, B)
z5 [e(A3, S)e(A2A4, B)]
z0Γf6 ,
e(HO(IDO),KT )
z6 e(A2, B)
−z0Γf8
)
• Check f = H
(
(Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ5)||C||v1||V2||M ||
(β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8)
)
If the hash check is successful, then the message will be
accepted; otherwise rejected.
IV. THE PROPOSAL
We start with VANET based IBGS scheme described in
section III and reconsider the signature generation in [1] to
remove some redundant parts2. Then, we modify the ver-
ification algorithm to apply an efficient batch verification.
Finally, we propose a batch scheduling algorithm to gear up
the verification in a runtime environment.
A. Modified Signature.
We follow the same signature in section III, but modify
the final part of signature. Here we describe the only the
modified portion. A signer who possesses group signing key
can anonymously generate a signature on a message M .
2Size of the signature in [1] is larger than [9].
• Compute (β4, β6, β8) as section III.
• Modified signature will be:
Υ′ = (Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ5)||(z0, z1, z2, z3, Z1, Z2, Z3)||
(β4, β6, β8)||f ||C||v1||V2
B. Modified Individual Verification.
We have observed that (β4, β6, β8) is the most expensive
part of the verification. In section III, we gave the verification
mechanism of [1] which is modified here according to the
above signature Υ′ to reduce the cost of individual verification.
To verify signature Υ′ of a message M one can perform the
following:
• Compute S = CKTHR(C||IDR)
• Compute (β0, β1, β2, β3, β5, β7) =
(Az0Γf0 , Z1A
z0
1 Γ
f
1 , Z2A
z0
2 Γ
f
2 , Z3A
z0
3 Γ
f
3 ,Γ
z4
3 A
z0
4 Γ
f
5 , B
z6V f2 )
• Check f = H
(
(Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ5)||C||v1||V2||M ||
(β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8)
)
• Verify (β4, β6, β8) =(
[e(A1, B)
−1e(A2,KT )]z0 [e(Γ1, B)−1e(Γ2,KT )]f ,
e(A3, B)
z2 [e(A3, S)e(A2A4, B)]
z0 [e(A5, B)
−1e(Γ3, S)
e(Γ2Γ5, B)]
f , e(HO(IDO),KT )
z6e(A2, B)
−z0 [v1e(Γ2, B)−1]f
)
Compared with the verification mechanism of [1], we noticed
that (Γ4,Γ6,Γ8), S and (β0, β1, β2, β3, β5, β7) are not neces-
sary to be included in a signature, and thus, signature size is
reduced.
C. Modified Batch Verification.
The scheme in [1] exploits the techniques of [11] keeping in
mind that a multi-base exponentiation (pairing) takes a similar
time as a single-base exponentiation. Let a VANET device
receives n message-signature pair (Mi,Υ′i) where Υi′ =
(Γ0,i,Γ1,i,Γ2,i,Γ3,i,Γ5,i)||(β4,i, β6,i, β8,i)||fi||Ci||v1,i||V2,i||
(z0,i, z1,i, z2,i, z3,i, Z1,i, Z2,i, Z3,i).
• Compute S = CKTHR(C||IDR) once, because all vehi-
cles share the parameters C, IDR,KT [Technique 1, in
section 2.]
• For all i = 1, ...., n compute the non-pairing
equations:(β0,i, β1,i, β2,i, β3,i, β5,i, β7,i) =
(Az0Γfi0,i, Z1,iA
z0,i
1 Γ
fi
1,i, Z2,iA
z0,i
2 Γ
fi
2,i, Z3,iA
z0,i
3 Γ
fi
3,i,Γ
z4,i
3,i
A
z0,i
4 Γ
fi
5,i, B
z6,iV fi2 )
• For each i = 1, ........, n check the following:
fi = H
(
(Γ0,i,Γ1,i,Γ2,i,Γ3,i,Γ5,i)||Ci||v1,i||V2,i||Mi||
(β0,i, β1,i, β2,i, β3,i, β5,i, β7,i)
)
• Before starting a batch verification, we can simplify the
equation as follows:
β4 = [e(A1, B)
−1e(A2,KT )]z0 [e(Γ1, B)−1e(Γ2,KT )]f
= e(A1
−z0 , B)e(A2z0 ,KT )e(Γ1−f , B)e(Γ2f ,KT )
= e(A1
−z0Γ−f1 , B) e(A2
z0Γ2
f ,KT )
β6 = e(A3, B)
z5 [e(A3, S)e(A2A4, B)]
z0 [e(A5, B)
−1
e(Γ3, S)e(Γ2Γ5, B)]
f
= e(A3
z5 , B)e(A3
z0 , S)e(A2
z0A4
z0 , B)e(A5
−f , B)
e(Γ3
f , S)e(Γ2
fΓ5
f , B)
= e(A3
z5A2
z0A4
z0 A5
−fΓ2fΓ5f , B) e(A3z0Γ3f , S)
β8 = e(HO(IDO),KT )
z6 e(A2, B)
−z0 [v1 e(Γ2, B)−1]f
= e([HO(IDO)]
z6 ,KT ) e(A2
−z0 , B)(v1f ) e(Γ2−f , B)
= (v1
f ) e(A2
−z0Γ2−f , B) e([HO(IDO)]
z6 ,KT )
• Let ξb = A1−z0Γ
−f
1 ,
ξk = A2
z0Γ2
f ,
ζb = A3
z5A2
z0A4
z0A5
−fΓ2fΓ5f ,
ζs = A3
z0Γ3
f ,
χb = A2
−z0Γ2−f ,
χk = [HO(IDO)]
z6
• Hence (β4β6β8)
= (e(ξb, B)e(ξk,KT )e(ζb, B)e(ζs, S)e(χb, B)
e(χk,KT )(v1
f ))
= (e(ξbζb, B) e(ξkχk,KT ) e(ζs, S)(v1
f ))
• Applying Technique 1,3 in section II, choose the random
vector (δ1, ...., δl) where δi ∈ Zp; and check the
following pairing equations ∀i = 1, ........, n:∏n
i=1(β4,iβ6,iβ8,i)
δi
= e(
∏n
i=1 δiξb,iζb,i, B) e(
∏n
i=1 δiξk,iχk,i,KT )
e(
∏n
i=1 δiζs,i, S) (
∏n
i=1 δiv1,i
fi)
For simplicity let:
Mi = (β4,iβ6,iβ8,i)
δi , Bi = δiξb,iζb,i,
Qi = δiζs,i, Ki = δiξk,iχk,i and νi = δiv1,ifi
Hence,
∏n
i=1Mi = e(
∏n
i=1Bi, B) e(
∏n
i=1Ki,KT )
e(
∏n
i=1Qi, S)
∏n
i=1 νi
If the above equation is satisfied then verification is
successful; otherwise not.
D. Doubtable Message Verification.
Consider the verifying entity receives a message which has
a valid signature but the message is doubtable to be forged. It
might happen if the signer’s secret key is compromised. If the
message is found to be fraudulent then usually the certificate
of the compromised signer is revoked and the revocation list
updated. In [1] the authors suggested a tag specifying the
lifetime of the GM’s public key. TSD has the right to open
the encryption in the signature. To trace the actual signer of a
given signature Υ, TSD does the following:
• The verifier submits the message M with its correspond-
ing signature Υ to TSD which computes: v1/e(xO, V2) =
e(HV (IDV ), b) = υ
• TSD compare υ with the entry in registration table. If
no entry is found, output ⊥; else computes proof of
knowledge ω s.t. e(xO, V2) = v1/υ to justify.
1) Select (s0′, r0′, r1′) ∈ Z∗p and compute :
(Γ′0,Γ
′
1,Γ
′
2) = (xOA
s0
′
, e(A, V2)
s0
′
, e(A,B)s0
′
)
2) (β′0, β
′
1, β
′
2) = (HO(IDO)
r1
′
Ar0
′
, e(A, V2)
r0
′
,
e(A,B)r0
′
)
3) Compute f ′ = H((Γ′0,Γ
′
1,Γ
′
2)||(β′0, β′1, β′2)||v1||V2, υ)
4) (z0′, z1′) = (r0′ − f ′s0′), HO(IDO)r1′xOf ′)
5) Outputs the proof: ω = (Γ′0||f ′||(z0′, z1′))
Justification: GM or, corresponding vehicle now can check
the validity of the proof ω whether ID is the real signer of
corresponding signature Υ for message M .
• Compute: (υ, υ′) = (e(HV (IDV ), B), v1/υ) and
• (Γ′1,Γ
′
2) = (e(Γ
′
0, V2)/M
′, e(Γ′0, B)e(HO(IDO),KT )
• (β′0, β
′
1, β
′
2) = (z1
′)Γ′0
f ′
Az0
′
, e(A, V2)
z0
′
Γ′1
f ′
,
e(A,B)z0
′
Γ′2
f ′
)
• Compare: f ′ = H((Γ′0,Γ
′
1,Γ
′
2)||(β′0, β′1, β′2)||v1||V2, υ)
If the above equation holds, the verifier will be assured about
the message signer’’s ID as a real signer, hence justified.
E. Batch Scheduling.
In a VANET environment, signatures arrive sequentially
with respect to time. OBU usually processes the signature
First Come First Serve (FCFS) basis. But we cannot apply
FCFS for n number of signatures, because sometimes
prioritized emergency data like message from fire service
vehicle, ambulance etc. might be arrived with lower deadline
and/or higher weight value. That is why, it is practical to
process the signatures according to their priority. In the
proposed algorithm, we consider due time of each signatures
by which it can be scheduled to get faster response and
we also introduce the parameter weight for each signature.
By default, weight could be a fixed value for example- ‘1’.
But in special cases, it might have some different value
which results providing higher priority to certain vehicles
e.g., vehicle of prime minister, doctors etc. In addition, we
can make different groups of vehicles with different weight
as a parameter e.g., public service buses, personal cars etc.
Besides these, it is obvious that if we increase the batch
size n, it will give us more optimized computation time
for n signatures but also increases completion time Ci of
individual signature. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
the batch size and completion time. Choosing the value of
n is not easy task. For example, the value of n during rush
hour at downtown could be greater than off-peak traffic
times, or the same at uptown. For the batch verification of
size n, a vehicle needs waiting for n signatures to arrive
to commence verification. However, we can utilize idle
time (waiting time) with partial computations of incoming
signatures as it arrives while batch verification continues. We
carefully observe that the right side of each batch verification
pairing: e(
∏n
i=1Bi, B), e(
∏n
i=1Ki,KT ), and e(
∏n
i=1Qi, S)
is common which contribute to partial computation of left part
for consecutive signatures. So, we will discuss the scheduling
of signatures for partial computation and hence devise an
algorithm to find an optimal number n of signatures to be
batched at a time. That’s why, We split the ith signature’s
pairing verification into 2 parts:
• Verification Part 1: ComputeMi, Bi, Ki, Qi, and νi
of corresponding signature with single machine schedul-
ing policy as it arrives.
• Verification Part 2: Compute and verify:
∏n
i=1Mi =
e(
∏n
i=1Bi, B) e(
∏n
i=1Ki,KT ) e(
∏n
i=1Qi, S)
∏n
i=1 νi
At first, we consider Single Machine Scheduling Problem
with Release Times and Identical Processing Times for batch
scheduling [14]; where the release times, due dates, and
sequence-dependent set-up times of jobs are taken into con-
sideration. The objective is to find a feasible set of jobs which
are to be completed before or at their deadlines. Secondly, an
algorithm is devised to find the optimal number of signatures
to be processed in a batch.
Suppose that there are n signature verifications Ji (i =
1, ..., n) to be scheduled, and each signature has a release time
ri, a due time di, finishing time for verification part 1 Ci and
the processing requirement of part 1 by pi. A total schedule
is expressed as a set X of signatures such that the total weight∑
i∈X wi is maximal. Besides that, we assume that processing
times for all the signature verification part 1 are same: pi = p
for all i where p is an arbitrary integer and ri + pi ≤ di.
Signatures are indexed in a non-decreasing order of due time
di. If the release times ri are not multiples of p problems,
it becomes more complex than problems with unit processing
times pi = 1. Such kind of scheduling problem is called:
1|ri; pj = p|
∑
wiUi where U stands for Unit penalty per late
job in the standard scheduling terminology.
Ui =
{
0 if Ci ≤ di
1 otherwise
Example: 1|ri; pj = p with given release time ri, due time di
and pi = p = 2
i 1 2 3 4
Processing time pi 2 2 2 2
Release time ri 1 2 3 8
Due time di 3 6 4 11
Completion time Ci 3 7 5 10
Lateness Li := (Ci − di) 0 1 1 −1
Unit penalty Ui 0 1 1 0
Max. Completion time Cmax 10
Max Lateness Lmax 1
A schedule for subset X is feasible if and only if:
1) All signature verification part 1 set X start after or at
their release date and are completed before or at their
due time, and
Fig. 3. Instance for 1|ri; pj = p|
2) They do not overlap in time.
An optimal schedule will exist if each computation of the
signature verification part 1 starts at a time belonging to the
set.
T := ri + lp | i = 1, ...., n; l = 0, ..., n− 1
Let S be an optimal schedule with i1, i2, ..., in order. It can
be transferred to a feasible schedule; for example iv can be
shifted to the left until its release time and due time (rv, dv)
coincide.
For any integer k ≤ n and s, e ∈ T with s ≤ e. Let Uk(s, e)
be the set of verification part 1 i ≤ k with s ≤ ri < e. and
W ∗k (s, e) is the maximal total weight of a subset of Uk(s, e)
with
1) S is idle before s+ p and after e
2) The start time of all i ∈ T
Algorithm 1 SIGNATURE SCHEDULING (1|ri; pj = p|
∑
wiUi)
INPUT: ri, di, pi
OUTPUT: Feasible schedule of signatures with maximal
total weight Wk(s, e).
1) Enumerate the signatures s.t., d1 ≤ d2 ≤ ... ≤ dn;
2) ∀s, e ∈ T with s ≤ e : W0(s, e) := 0; FOR (k = 1 TO
n)
∀s, e ∈ T with s ≤ e
Wk(s, e) :=
{
Wk−1(s, e) if rk /∈ [s, e)
max{Wk−1(s, e),W ′k(s, e)} otherwise
where
W ′k(s, e) :=

max{wk +Wk−1(s, s′) +Wk−1(s′, e)}
such that s′ ∈ Ti and
max{rk, s+ p} ≤ s′ ≤ min{dk, e} − p;
3) Calculate Wn(s, e) := ( min t− p, max t) for t ∈ T
Theorem 1: For k = 0, ..., n and ∀s, e ∈ T such that s ≤ e
the equality Wk(s, e) = W ∗k (s, e) holds [14].
For each value of k,O(n4) values of Wk have to be com-
puted. As T contains O(n2) elements, overall time complexity
of this algorithm is O(n7). However, when release and due
dates of jobs are ordered similarly ([ri < ri+1] [di ≤ di+1]),
the same problem is solvable in O(n2) with a dynamic
programming algorithm in [16]. In VANET environment, if
we do not consider any prioritized message/signature, we can
adopt the algorithm in [16].
In [17], authors present a modified tabu search algorithm
that also schedules n jobs to a single machine in order to mini-
mize the maximum lateness of the jobs. The objective function
of the scheduling problem is to minimize Lmax(Π) = max Li,
where Li = Ci − di. A total schedule is expressed as a set
Π = {pi(1), pi(1), ..., pi(n)}, where pi(j) is the index of the job
in position j of the schedule.
In [15] Noy, et al. proposes a single machine throughput
maximization real time scheduling algorithm for n jobs
where each job is associated with corresponding weight wi
which is the value/revenue of completed job and deadline
di. Let for k batches, they have nj as batch size, Fj as
family which is associated with processing time. Jobs with
same processing time belong to same family and can be
executed in the same batch. Their goal was to find a feasible
schedule of batching several jobs of the same type together
to maximize weight. This type of problems are referred to as
real time scheduling problem and maximizing weight referred
to as throughput. Authors suggested that if the number of
families are fixed, then this type of problems can be solved as
dynamic programming. For bounded batch size b they prove
and conclude the problem be solved optimally where F is
some constant value depends on weight of jobs.
Theorem 2: 1|f−batch, b, rj , F =const|
∑
wj(1−Uj) can
be solved optimally in O(nF
2+3F+3log n) steps.
In our batch scheduling mechanism, we can assume 2
batches as verification part 1 and verification part 2 from
different family Fj , because each batch is responsible for
different types of computation as mentioned before. That is
why, the batch scheduling problem can be solved optimally
with dynamic programming with finite steps.
We propose Algorithm 2 for signature verification part
2, that is, to find out the optimum value of the number of
signatures be batched at a time.
For implementation, we consider 6 queues named
M,B,K,Q,V,P. From the algorithm 1 we get the optimal
schedule of signature verification part 1 and hence corre-
sponding values Mi, Bi, Ki, Qi, and νi in the respective
named queues. Now we will consider the algorithm for veri-
fication part 2 which is responsible for pairing computation
and incur maximum time among all the computations. Our
proposal is running two batches for verification part 1 and
part 2 simultaneously as two threads. From the record, one
can easily take decision on the optimized batch size b from
Maximum completion time Cmaxb and Maximum Lateness
Lmaxb of a batch. Therefore, the threshold value of batch size
b should be chosen carefully to keep the batch verification
system remain consistent, flexible and efficient.
V. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY
A. Security Analysis.
The properties of IBGS [9] allow the vehicles to trans-
mit/receive messages without leaking their identities. The
tracing manager TSD can trace a forged identity and revoke
Algorithm 2 SCHEDULING VERIFICATION PART 2
INPUT: Setup time sb, Completion time Ci, Due time di, 6
queues M,B,K,Q,V,P
OUTPUT: (Batch size b , Max. Completion time Cmaxb, Max.
Lateness Lmaxb.
• FOR (b = 2 to n)
1) Pop ith value from M,B,K,Q,V,P and
2) Calculate η = e(
∏b
i=1Bi, B) e(
∏b
i=1Ki,KT )
e(
∏b
i=1Qi, S)
∏b
i=t νi
3) Calculate µ =
∏b
i=1Mi
4) Check µ = η. If successful then:
– Push the result of η into queue P for future use.
– Set operation time of batch size b as bt
– Calculate Maximum Completion time of a batch
Cmaxb := sb + bt + Cmax
– Calculate Maximum Lateness of a batch
Lmaxb := Cmaxb − di=1
– Record (b, Cmaxb , Lmaxb).
5) Else if µ 6= η, report batch error and Exit.
6) Continue until Queues: M, B, K, Q, V become
empty.
the certificate of an anonymous vehicle. To meet the aforemen-
tioned security requirement, in [9] it is shown that IBGS group
signature scheme is correct, anonymous, traceable, and non-
frameable. The scheme is correct as the message generated
by vehicles will always be accepted by other vehicles and
hence guide vehicles for potential improvement of traffic
safety and efficiency. If a vehicle is not registered with MVD ,
revocability, liability and scalability, it cannot create messages
even if the cheating vehicle is allowed to access valid messages
thorough VANET. An attacker cannot cheat other vehicles even
by forging a new valid message or modifying a valid message.
This ensures the scheme’s liability.
The scheme is non-frameable as no party except the MVD
can produce a signature that can be accepted by the verification
procedure. This strong security notion guarantees that if a
message is accepted as valid,it must have been generated
by single registered vehicle and not have been tempered
with since it was sent. The originators of valid messages
are anonymous which means an attacker cannot decide the
message originator with a probability non-negligibly greater
than 1/2. A trusted third party called TSD can trace the
anonymous generator of any valid message. No group member
or set of colluding members can generate a group signature
accepted by the verification procedure which is not linkable
to the actual signer.
B. Efficiency Analysis.
We compare batch verification with the earlier batch
verification mechanism for IBGS [1] as both of them have
the same goals and followed the same signature scheme. Our
scheme provides the same security and privacy features with a
faster verification mechanism. This is due to three reasons: (1)
Our new signature size for the batch verification is less than
the previous one; (2) We reduce number individual message
verifications and batch verifications as well; (3) We propose a
runtime batch scheduling algorithm for signature verification
and an algorithm to find out the optimum size of the batch.
First of all, the previous verification signature was: Υ′ =
Υ||(Γ4,Γ6,Γ8)||(β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8)||S where Υ =
(Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ5)||(z0, z1, z2, z3, Z1, Z2, Z3)||f ||C||v1||V2.
Instead, we propose a simplified signature and assume it
would be enough for batch verification. We selected the
three most complex pairings parameters to pad the original
signature, which will give the same functionality as well as
less bandwidth and memory consumption. We propose the
modified signature as: Υ′ = Υ||(β4, β6, β8). Secondly, we
have fewer pairing computations than the previous scheme.
Our scheme has only 3 pairings in final verification while
previous scheme had 11 pairings. Thirdly, we introduce a
scheduling algorithm for the incoming signatures, which is
very important for VANET environment, where sometimes
messages/signatures are prioritized with weights and short
deadlines. Finally, we propose an algorithm to explore the
best possible batch size n for any specific environment by
parallelizing the independently computationable components
to set maximum signatures to be processed without any idle
time between them. We believe that our algorithms can be
implemented for other batch verification algorithms as well
to find out the optimum number of signatures to be processed
at a time in batch. However, as we used Small Exponent test
for batch verification, we accept the probability of invalid
signature 2lb , where lb is the security level [10].
VI. CONCLUSION
In group signature mechanisms usually large numbers of
signatures need to be verified. Designing a batch verification
mechanism partially addresses this problem, but batch verifica-
tions need to be optimized as much as possible. In this paper
we have presented an extremely efficient batch verification
system from a IBGS group signature scheme for VANET
environments. We have further presented a batch scheduling
algorithm to accelerate batch verification. Our scheme not
only provides the desired level of security requirements, but
also is efficient in storage and computation. We believe it
can be implemented in any ad hoc network with minimum
resource constraints, especially in MANET environments. Our
batch scheduling environment can be applied to any batch
verification systems available. In future, we would like to
evaluate the result on a large scale VANET testbed with
varying different scheduling algorithms.
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